PhD: On Movers and Makers

What is it for a composite being, such as an animal, to be active in the world? The central proposal of my thesis is that while much of the activity of a composite being involves the composite being causing changes in the world, activity cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of causation. I argue, instead, that activity is primitive.


The Causal Interaction Problem for Abstracta

  • Departmental Symposium, UCL (November 2017)

Agency, Causation, and Deviance

  • UCL-Leipzig Workshop, Leipzig University (June 2017)
  • The Cognitive Science Research Group, New College of the Humanities (June 2017)

Movement of the Body and Causation by the Agent

  • Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of London (March 2017)

Davidson’s Challenge for Irreducible Agent-Causation

  • Workshop on Agency and Causation: Formal and Conceptual Issues, Ghent University (October 2016)

Demystifying the Agent-Causation Debate

  • Cumberland Lodge UCL Philosophy Weekend (October 2016)

The Agent’s Causal Role in Action

  • London-Warwick Mind Forum (November 2015)
  • Open Minds X, University of Manchester (July 2015)

Getting Over the Overdetermination Argument

  • Philosophy Graduate Conference, UCL (September 2015)