Research

Publications:

‘Are Two-Way Powers Causal Powers?’ forthcoming in Philosophy.

‘Causality, Determination and Necessitation in Free Human Action’ Synthese (2022). Available here.

‘Created, Changeable, and Yet Acausal?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (2019).  Available here.

PhD: Movers and Makers

When we act intentionally, changes and states in the world come about, and they come about as a result of our intentional actions. We bear a particular kind of responsibility for those changes and states, which I call agential responsibility. What more can be said about what it is to be agentially responsible for some change or state? It is argued here that, contrary to a wide variety of contemporary views, it is not an essential part of what it is to be agentially responsible for a change or state that the agent causes that change or state. It is put forward that agential responsibility is a primitive form of responsibility, not to be accounted for fully in terms of causal responsibility.