‘Created, Changeable, and Yet Acausal?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (2019). Available here.
PhD: Movers and Makers
When we act intentionally, changes and states in the world come about, and they come about as a result of our intentional actions. We bear a particular kind of responsibility for those changes and states, which I call agential responsibility. What more can be said about what it is to be agentially responsible for some change or state? It is argued here that, contrary to a wide variety of contemporary views, it is not an essential part of what it is to be agentially responsible for a change or state that the agent causes that change or state. It is put forward that agential responsibility is a primitive form of responsibility, not to be accounted for fully in terms of causal responsibility. Agential responsibility is fully accounted for only in terms of explanation — which may include non-causal explanation — by intentional action.
The Strong Corporealist Approach to Intentional Action
- Human Abilities Colloquium, HU & FU Berlin (Nov 2020).
The First Person in Action
- Workshop on Subject and Object manuscript by Adrian Haddock, Utrecht University (Feb 2020).
The Significance of Transitive Verbs in Action
- Humboldt Seminar, University of Leipzig (Jan 2020).
Are Two-Way Powers Causal Powers?
- ‘Two-Way Powers’, Action-Network Annual Meeting, University of Leipzig (Jul 2019).
No Objection to Object-Causation
- Humboldt Seminar, University of Leipzig (Nov 2018)
The Importance of Being Creative
- Humboldt Colloquium, University of Leipzig (Feb 2018).
- Agency Workshop, University of Tübingen (Apr 2019).
Created, Changeable, and Yet Acausal?
- Postgraduate Session, Joint Session of Aristotelian Society & Mind Association (Jul 2018).
The Causal Interaction Problem for Abstracta
- Departmental Symposium, UCL (November 2017)
Agency, Causation, and Deviance
- UCL-Leipzig Workshop, Leipzig University (June 2017)
- The Cognitive Science Research Group, New College of the Humanities (June 2017)
Movement of the Body and Causation by the Agent
- Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of London (March 2017)
Davidson’s Challenge for Irreducible Agent-Causation
- Workshop on Agency and Causation: Formal and Conceptual Issues, Ghent University (October 2016)
Demystifying the Agent-Causation Debate
- Cumberland Lodge UCL Philosophy Weekend (October 2016)
The Agent’s Causal Role in Action
- London-Warwick Mind Forum (November 2015)
- Open Minds X, University of Manchester (July 2015)
Getting Over the Overdetermination Argument
- Philosophy Graduate Conference, UCL (September 2015)