‘Created, Changeable, and Yet Acausal?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (forthcoming).  Available here.

Papers in Progress:

‘The Significance of Transitive Action Verbs.’

‘In the Midst of it: Action Events in Progress.’

‘I Know What I’m Doing, but I Don’t Know What I’ve Done.’

‘Changeable Abstract Artefacts.’

‘The Importance of Being Creative: On The Creation and Change of Abstract Artefacts.’

‘Basic Action and Non-Alienation.’

‘Are Two-Way Powers Causal Powers?’

PhD: Movers and Makers

When we act, changes and states of the world come about, and they come about as a result of our actions. We bear a particular kind of responsibility for those changes and states that come about as a result of our actions, which I call agential responsibility. But what more can be said about what it is to be agentially responsible for a change or states of the world? That is the question that this thesis addresses. It is argued here that, contrary to a favoured view, it is not an essential part of what it is to be agentially responsible for a change or state that the agent causes that change or state. It is put forward that agential responsibility is, instead, a primitive form of responsibility, independent of causal responsibility. The concept of agential responsibility, along with the concepts of agency and action, is a primitive concept, not to be elucidated in non-agential terms. What can be said is simply that for a change or state to be such that one is agentially responsible for it is for its coming about to be explicable in terms of one’s acting.


Are Two-Way Powers Causal Powers?

  • ‘Two-Way Powers’, Action-Network Annual Meeting, University of Leipzig (Jul 2019).

No Objection to Object-Causation

  • Humboldt Seminar, University of Leipzig (Nov 2018)

The Importance of Being Creative

  • Humboldt Colloquium, University of Leipzig (Feb 2018).
  • Agency Workshop, University of Tübingen (Apr 2019).

Created, Changeable, and Yet Acausal?

  • Postgraduate Session, Joint Session of Aristotelian Society & Mind Association (Jul 2018).

The Causal Interaction Problem for Abstracta

  • Departmental Symposium, UCL (November 2017)

Agency, Causation, and Deviance

  • UCL-Leipzig Workshop, Leipzig University (June 2017)
  • The Cognitive Science Research Group, New College of the Humanities (June 2017)

Movement of the Body and Causation by the Agent

  • Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of London (March 2017)

Davidson’s Challenge for Irreducible Agent-Causation

  • Workshop on Agency and Causation: Formal and Conceptual Issues, Ghent University (October 2016)

Demystifying the Agent-Causation Debate

  • Cumberland Lodge UCL Philosophy Weekend (October 2016)

The Agent’s Causal Role in Action

  • London-Warwick Mind Forum (November 2015)
  • Open Minds X, University of Manchester (July 2015)

Getting Over the Overdetermination Argument

  • Philosophy Graduate Conference, UCL (September 2015)